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WHAT IS THE RELEVANT PARCEL?
CLARIFYING THE “PARCEL AS A
WHOLE” STANDARD IN MURR V.
WISCONSIN
GAVIN S. FRISCH*
INTRODUCTION
“If there is a consensus today about regulatory takings law, it is that
it is highly muddled.”1 Much of this “muddle” results from the Supreme
Court’s decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York,2 which requires courts to analyze takings claims using a threepart, ad hoc test that measures the extent of the property owner’s loss
against the value of the “parcel as a whole.”3 In subsequent decisions,
the Court has repeated the Penn Central rule but has provided minimal
guidance for lower courts, furthering confusion in the realm of
regulatory takings law.4 Notably, the Court has failed to announce a
rule for determining the “parcel as a whole.”5 As a result of this lack of
clarity, lower courts have been “invited to engage in open-ended value
judgments.”6
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1. John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1006
(2003).
2. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
3. See Brief of the Cato Institute and Owners’ Counsel of America as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 6–12, Murr v. Wisconsin, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016) (No. 15-214) [hereinafter
Brief of the Cato Institute].
4. John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171,
171–72 (2005).
5. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
533 U.S. 606 (2001); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302 (2002). These are examples of regulatory takings cases in which the Court considered the
“parcel as a whole” but declined to elaborate a specific rule.
6. See Brief of the Cato Institute, supra note 3, at 9 (quoting J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments
for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 104 (1995)).
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With lower courts formulating their own tests, property owners
have largely been unsuccessful in their challenges, losing approximately
ninety percent of takings claims.7 An example of these unsuccessful
takings claimants is the case of Joseph, Donna, Michael, and Peggy
Murr (collectively “the Murrs”), owners of two adjacent properties
along the St. Croix River.8 The Murrs have spent years combating local
and state authorities in a quest to renovate their riverside cabin and sell
their adjacent property, but the Wisconsin courts have consistently
ruled against them.9
Despite their repeated failures, the Murrs have a chance to
persuade the Court that Penn Central’s “parcel as a whole” concept
needs further clarification for lower courts to implement it effectively.
During the 2016-2017 term, the Court will decide whether, in a
regulatory takings case, the “parcel as a whole” concept as described in
Penn Central establishes a rule that two legally distinct but commonly
owned contiguous parcels must be combined for takings analysis
purposes.10
This commentary will first set forth the factual and procedural
history behind the Murrs’ takings claim. Second, there will be a brief
discussion of takings jurisprudence. Part III details the lower court’s
holding in the Murrs’ takings claim. Part IV analyzes the claim to
identify the party that should prevail. Finally, the commentary will
conclude briefly with the expected outcome of the case.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Murrs’ parents purchased two parcels of land on the St. Croix
River in 1960 and 1963—each parcel approximately one and onequarter acre in area.11 On the first lot (Lot F), the parents built a cabin
near the river and transferred the title to their plumbing company.12
Three years later, they purchased the second lot (Lot E), which has

7. F. Patrick Hubbard et al., Do Owners Have a Fair Chance of Prevailing Under the Ad
Hoc Regulatory Takings Test of Penn Central Transportation Company?, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 121, 141 (2003).
8. Murr v. State, No. 2013AP2828, 2014 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1041, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App.
2014).
9. See id.; see also Murr v. St. Croix Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 796 N.W.2d 837 (Wis. Ct. App.
2011).
10. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at i, Murr v. Wisconsin, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016) (No. 15214) [hereinafter Petitioners’ Brief].
11. Murr, 796 N.W.2d at 841.
12. Id.
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remained vacant ever since.13 In 1994 and 1995, respectively, the parents
transferred Lot F and Lot E (collectively “the Lots”) to the Murrs, with
the second transfer bringing the Lots under the Murrs’ common
ownership.14
After flooding from the river damaged the cabin, the Murrs wanted
to reconstruct the cabin on higher ground and requested six variances
and two special exception permits from the St. Croix County Board of
Adjustment (“Board”).15 Planning to sell Lot E to finance construction
on Lot F, one of the variances sought the Board’s approval to use Lot
E and Lot F as separate building sites.16 While the Lots were legally
distinct properties, they were effectively merged under a 1976 St. Croix
County ordinance (“Ordinance”) that was enacted to comply with
federal and state laws designating the St. Croix River as part of the
National Wild and Scenic River System.17 The Ordinance required that
adjacent substandard lots in common ownership contain at least one
acre of buildable area in order to be sold or developed as separate lots.18
While the Murrs owned a total of 2.5 acres, the buildable area of Lot E
is only 0.5 acres and the buildable area of Lot F is 0.48 acres.19
After a public hearing, the Board denied all eight variances and the
Murrs sought certiorari review before the circuit court.20 The circuit
court affirmed the Board’s denial of the Murrs’ request to use Lot E
and Lot F as separate building sites but reversed the Board on the
remaining seven requests.21 The Murrs appealed and the Board crossappealed the circuit court’s decision.22 The Murrs argued that the Lots
were exempt from the Ordinance because the Lots were not under
common ownership when the Ordinance was enacted.23 Rejecting the
Murrs’ interpretation of the Ordinance, a three-judge panel on the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld the Board’s denial of all eight

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 842.
Id.
Id. at 841.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 840.
Id. at 843.
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requests.24 The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the Murrs request for
an appeal.25
The Murrs decided to take a different approach and filed a new
complaint in circuit court against the State of Wisconsin (“State”) and
St. Croix County (“County”).26 The Murrs alleged that the Ordinance
resulted in a taking without just compensation under Section Thirteen
of Article One of Wisconsin’s Constitution because the Ordinance
deprived the Murrs of “all, or practically all, of the use of Lot E.”27 The
State and County separately moved for summary judgment, but
essentially set forth the same four arguments.28
The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State and
County,29 but took an unusual approach. After concluding that the
Murrs’ claim was time barred, the circuit court nevertheless reached the
merits of the takings challenge.30 The circuit court determined that
regulatory takings law required an analysis of the Ordinance’s effect on
the Murrs’ property “as a whole” instead of each individual lot.31
Noting that the Murrs could build a cabin located entirely on either lot
or straddled across both of the Lots, as well as the fact that the
combined properties retained significant value, the circuit court
concluded that there was no compensable taking.32
On appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit
court by rejecting the Murrs’ takings claim as a matter of law.33 Without
reaching the issue of whether the Murrs’ claim was time barred, the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected the Murrs’ argument that there
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the contiguous Lots
were used together such that they could be considered as one property
for regulatory takings analysis.34 Despite the existence of a statutory
procedure for modifying the boundaries of real property lots, the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that the Ordinance effectively
merged the Murrs’ Lots but did not deprive the Murrs of all or
24.
25.
26.
2014).
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 844–45.
Murr v. St. Croix Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 803 N.W.2d 849 (Wis. 2011).
Murr v. State, No. 2013AP2828, 2014 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1041, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App.
Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *6–7.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *7–8.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *14–15.
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substantially all practical use of the combined property.35 Once again,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied further review.36
On August 14, 2015, the Murrs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
to the Supreme Court.37 On January 15, 2016, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether in a regulatory takings case the
“parcel as a whole” concept establishes a rule that two legally distinct
but commonly owned contiguous parcels must be combined for takings
analysis purposes.38
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Fifth Amendment Takings Clause & Penn Central
The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause states that “private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”39 The Takings Clause largely “operates as a conditional
limitation, permitting the government to do what it wants so long as it
pays the charge.”40 This right to just compensation for takings of private
property has been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment
to apply to the states.41
Until the Supreme Court decided Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,42 the Court had interpreted the government’s conditional
requirement to only provide just compensation to physical invasions or
appropriations of land.43 Mahon extended the conditional requirement
by holding that a government restriction of the owner’s use of land may
qualify for just compensation under the Takings Clause.44 Recognizing
that the government cannot reasonably pay for every change in law
that might diminish property values, Justice Holmes established the

35. Id. at *1.
36. Murr v. State, 862 N.W.2d 899 (Wis. 2015).
37. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 10, at 1.
38. Murr, 2014 Wis. App. LEXIS 1041 (Wis. App. 2014), cert. granted, Murr v. Wisconsin,
136 S. Ct. 890 (2016).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
40. Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 487 n.19 (2005) (quoting E. Enters. v.
Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part)).
41. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
42. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
43. Keith Woffinden, Comment, The Parcel as a Whole: A Presumptive Structural Approach
for Determining When the Government Has Gone Too Far, 2008 BYU L. REV. 623, 626 (2008).
44. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415–17.
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general rule that property may be regulated, yet regulation that goes
“too far” will constitute a taking.45
Over half a century after Justice Holmes announced the “too far”
rule for takings, the Court established a three-part ad hoc test to
determine if a regulation has gone “too far” in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City.46 Under the ad hoc test, the Court
must assess (1) the “economic impact of the regulation,” (2) “the extent
to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations,” and (3) the “character of the government action.”47
Additionally, Penn Central established the general principle that courts
must consider the “parcel as a whole” to determine whether the
government’s action results in a taking.48 In rejecting the appellants’
claim that a New York City law effected a taking because the law
deprived the appellants of the “air rights” above the existing property,
the Court noted:
“Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a
particular governmental action has effected a taking, [the] Court
focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature
and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole. . .
.49

The Court held that New York City’s landmark law did not effect a
taking of the appellant’s “air rights” because it determined that the city
tax block was the relevant parcel.50 However, the Court failed to
explain how it determined that the city tax block was “the parcel as a
whole.”51
While most takings claims are subject to Penn Central’s ad hoc test,
the Court has recognized two types of per se takings.52 One type of per
se taking was recognized in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp.,53 where the Court held that a permanent physical occupation of
private property is a per se taking even if the government’s action only

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 415–16.
438 U.S. 104, 124–28 (1978).
Woffiden, supra note 43, at 627 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124).
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130–31.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
See id. at 1030–39.
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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has a minimal economic impact on the owner.54 This type of per se
taking is not relevant to Murr. The second type of per se taking is
discussed below.
B. Lucas & Subsequent Takings Clause Case Law
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,55 the Court established
a second category of per se takings, called “total takings.”56 Writing for
the majority, Justice Scalia held that a governmental action that
deprives an owner’s property “of all economically beneficial use”
constitutes a taking “unless the proscribed use interests were not part
of the title to begin with.”57 While “all economically beneficial use”
seems to imply a one hundred percent loss of use, the Court left open
the possibility that the loss of use need not be exactly one hundred
percent.58
In footnote seven (“Lucas Footnote Seven”), the majority
recognized that the total takings rule was difficult to apply by stating
that “the rule does not make clear the ‘property interest’ against which
the loss of value is to be measured.”59 Fortunately, the majority
provided guidance in two key ways.60 First, the majority rejected the
view adopted by the New York Court of Appeals in Penn Central where
the court examined the diminution in the parcel’s value “in light of total
value of the takings claimant’s other holdings in the vicinity.”61
Additionally, the majority indicated that the relevant parcel can be
impacted by the owner’s reasonable expectations.62 The majority’s
determination of the relevant parcel mirrors the second prong of Penn
Central’s ad hoc test, which considers if the deprivation runs contrary
to reasonable, investment-backed expectations.63 While the majority
recognized that state property law shape the expectations of land
owners, the Court did not resolve the “parcel as a whole” question

54. Id. at 434–35.
55. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
56. Id. at 1027.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1016–17 n.7.
59. Id.
60. See Woffiden, supra note 43, at 631.
61. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016–17 n.7 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366
N.E.2d 1271, 1276–77 (NY Ct. App. 1977), aff’d, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
62. Id.
63. Compare id., with Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(the second prong of the ad hoc test requires courts to consider “the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations”).
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because the property owner’s fee simple interest had been deprived of
all economic value of the lots he owned in the area.64
A decade after deciding Lucas, the Court in Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency65 relied
on the “parcel as a whole” concept to decide a total takings challenge
against a construction moratorium for areas surrounding Lake Tahoe.66
Property owners claimed the moratorium effected a total taking
because their land was deprived of all economic use for the duration of
the moratorium.67 The Court rejected the property owners’ argument
because dividing the property interest up into temporal segments
“ignor[ed] Penn Central’s admonition that in regulatory takings cases
we must focus on ‘the parcel as a whole.’”68 The Tahoe-Sierra decision
provided further guidance to lower courts by stating that an interest in
real property, and therefore the relevant parcel, is defined by
geographical and temporal dimensions.69
III. HOLDING
In a per curiam opinion, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed
the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that the Murrs
failed to allege a taking as a matter of law because the Ordinance did
not deprive the Murrs of all or substantially all of the practical use of
their property.70 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals determined the
Murrs’ claim was governed by Zealy v. City of Waukesha,71 state law
precedent that applied Penn Central’s parcel as a whole concept.72
Zealy rejected a property owner’s argument that the city effected a
total taking through regulations that precluded residential
development on over eighty percent of the owner’s property because
the property owner retained over two acres zoned for economically
beneficial use.73 In holding that no compensable taking occurred, Zealy
noted that “the United States Supreme Court has never endorsed a test
that ‘segments’ a contiguous property to determine the relevant
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
2014).
71.
72.
73.

Lucas, 505 U.S.. at 1016–17 n.7.
535 U.S. 302 (2002).
Id. at 330–32.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 331 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130–31).
Id. at 331–32 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. §§ 7–9 (1936)).
Murr v. State, No. 2013AP2828, 2014 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1041, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App.
201 Wis. 2d 365 (Wis. 1996).
Murr, 2014 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1041 at *11–14 (citing Zealy, 201 Wis. 2d at 372).
See Zealy, 201 Wis. 2d. at 376–80.
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parcel.”74 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals interpreted Zealy as setting
forth “a well-established rule that contiguous property under common
ownership is considered as a whole regardless of the number of parcels
contained therein.”75
In applying Zealy to reach the holding that the Ordinance had not
effected a compensable taking, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals defined
the “parcel as a whole” as the combination of Lots E and F.76 The court
noted that the Ordinance permitted the Murrs to build a new residence
that “could be located entirely on Lot E, entirely on Lot F, or it could
straddle both lots.”77 Because the Murrs retained the ability to use the
combined property as a residential property, the Ordinance did not
effect a taking that deprived the Murrs of “all or substantially all” of
the practical use or value of their property.78 Furthermore, the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected the Murrs’ alternative claim of a
partial taking under the ad hoc inquiry.79
IV. ARGUMENTS
A. The Murrs’ Arguments
The Murrs argue that the relevant parcel is Lot E for analyzing the
effect of the Ordinance either as a per se taking under Lucas or a taking
based on Penn Central’s ad hoc test.80 The Murrs contend that Supreme
Court precedent “focuses on the single parcel that comprises the entire
fee simple interest.”81
This argument primarily lies in the hints offered by Lucas Footnote
Seven, where the Supreme Court rejected an approach to determining
the relevant parcel that aggregates parcels held by the owner within the
vicinity.82 Lucas hinted that determining the relevant parcel relates to
“how the owner’s reasonable expectations have been shaped by the
State’s law of property. . . .”83 Furthermore, Lucas elaborated that the
“State’s law of property” relevant to the inquiry depends on the degree
74. Id. at 375–76.
75. Murr, 2014 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1041, at *13.
76. See id. at *10–15.
77. Id. at *15.
78. Id. at *21.
79. Id. at *16–17.
80. Petitioners’ Reply Brief on the Merits at 2, Murr v. Wisconsin, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016) (No.
15-214) [hereinafter Petitioners’ Reply Brief].
81. Id.
82. Id. at 3.
83. Id. at 5.
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of legal recognition and protection accorded by the State’s law “to the
particular interest in land with respect to which the takings claimant
alleges and diminution in value.”84 Lucas avoided the difficult issue of
setting forth a clear “parcel as a whole” rule because the “particular
interest in land” pled by the takings claimant was a fee simple interest.85
Like the takings claimant in Lucas, the Murrs assert a taking of a fee
simple interest.86
Another argument advanced by the Murrs is that Lot E and Lot F
have not been legally joined but presently remain as separate, single,
and discrete parcels.87 This argument attacks the effect of the
Ordinance by claiming that the Ordinance does not eliminate lot lines
because Wisconsin has a statutory procedure in place for altering lot
lines.88 The statutory procedure requires a recorded survey to modify
the boundaries of any lot, but no recorded survey of Lot E had actually
taken place.89 Not only were the Lots created as legally separate parcels,
the Lots were taxed separately until the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
decided the Murrs’ initial lawsuit against the Board.90
Additionally, the Murrs argued that the chain of title supported
their claim that Lot E and Lot F were legally distinct parcels.91
Specifically, the Murrs’ parents brought Lot E and Lot F under
common ownership by transferring the title of Lot F from their
plumbing company to their personal names in 1982.92 Because the
parents transferred Lot F to the Murrs in 1994 without transferring Lot
E, the Murrs argue that Lots E and F did not legally become a single
parcel as the result of common ownership.93 The Murrs further support
their claim by contending that Wisconsin’s property regulations,
specifically the Ordinance, does not define the relevant parcel.94

84. Id.
85. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016–17 n.7 (1992).
86. Petitioners’ Reply Brief, supra note 80, at 6.
87. Id. at 7.
88. Id. (citing Wis. Stat. § 236 (2015)).
89. Id. at 7–9.
90. See Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 10, at 9; see also Brief for Respondent State of
Wisconsin at 40–41, Murr v. Wisconsin, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016) (No. 15-214).
91. Petitioners’ Reply Brief, supra note 80, at 10–11.
92. Id. at 10.
93. Id. at 10–11.
94. See id. at 11–16.
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B. St. Croix County & Wisconsin’s Arguments
The County and State both view the “parcel as a whole” as the
merger of Lot E and Lot F and contend that the Murrs took title to a
single merged parcel in 1995 under state law and takings law.95 To
identify the merged property as the relevant parcel, the State and
County rely on Lucas Footnote Seven.96 Because Supreme Court
precedent has routinely defined “property” protected by the Takings
Clause in the context of state law, the State claims that this approach is
the correct way to identify the relevant parcel.97
The State notes that evaluating takings claims with respect to the
owner’s reasonable expectations in light of state property law is
particularly useful for evaluating land lots because regulations with
respect to lot lines are within the realm of state law.98 For example,
states have the ability to set forth the manner in which lot lines are
drawn, altered, and merged.99 Not only would this approach respect
state sovereignty, it would provide an objective test for determining the
relevant parcel based on ex ante state law.100 This objective test, the
State claims, would deter manipulative behavior by both states and
property owners.101
When applied to the Murrs’ takings claim, the State argues that Lot
E and Lot F constitute a “parcel as a whole” because the Murrs had an
objectively reasonable expectation to take title to a single merged
parcel in 1995 in the context of the State and County’s property laws.102
Because the Ordinance was in place for nearly twenty years before the
Murrs took ownerships of the Lots, the Murrs had adequate notice that
the 1995 transfer would effectively merge Lot E and Lot F.103 Under
this approach, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals correctly applied Zealy
95. Brief for Respondent St. Croix County at 25, Murr, 136 S. Ct. 890 (No. 15-214); Brief for
Respondent State of Wisconsin, supra note 90, at 1.
96. See Brief for Respondent St. Croix County, supra note 95, at 28; see also Brief for
Respondent State of Wisconsin, supra note 90, at 23 (stating that the relevant parcel may depend
on the owner’s reasonable expectations in light of the State’s law of property).
97. Brief for Respondent State of Wisconsin, supra note 90, at 29–30.
98. Id. at 24.
99. Id. at 33–34.
100. Id. at 35–36.
101. Id. at 36–37 (contending, for example, that under an objective standard, an unexpected
change in a state’s property law without a grandfather clause to protect owners’ expectations
under ex ante state law would give rise to a takings challenge against the state’s change).
102. Id. at 37–38.
103. Brief for Respondent St. Croix County, supra note 95, at 34–35; Brief for Respondent
State of Wisconsin, supra note 90, at 44.
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to the Murrs’ request to segment their merged property into two
separate parcels for evaluating their takings claim.104
If the Supreme Court determines that a multi-factor approach is
better than the State’s approach to determining the relevant parcel, the
State argues that the merged property is still the relevant parcel.105 The
State claims that the Murrs had no “economic expectations” as a matter
of law to treat Lot E separately from Lot F and that there is no evidence
in support of any subjective expectations set forth by the Murrs.106
Additionally, the State disagrees with the Murrs’ contention that the
separate acquisition dates of the Lots merit treating the Lots as
separate parcels.107 The State further argues that the Murrs have in fact
treated Lot E and Lot F as a single unit, citing evidence that “vacant”
Lot E contains a propane tank, volleyball court, and access to the same
stretch of beach.108 Alternative arguments include the claim being time
barred and the Murrs failure to exhaust their administrative
remedies.109
V. ANALYSIS
The Court should hold for the Murrs and rule that Lot E is the
relevant parcel to analyze whether the Ordinance effected a taking that
requires just compensation. First, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals made
a crucial factual error by stating that the 1995 transfer of Lot E brought
the Lots under common ownership for the first time. Second, Penn
Central’s “parcel as a whole” concept should not be interpreted to
require courts to analyze takings claims by aggregating commonly
owned but legally distinct properties.
A. Error by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals made a crucial factual error that
underlies their rulings against the Murrs. Specifically, during the Murrs’
first appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals implied that the 1995
transfer of Lot E brought the Lots under common ownership for the

104. Brief for Respondent St. Croix County, supra note 95, at 39; Brief for Respondent State
of Wisconsin, supra note 90, at 38.
105. Brief for Respondent State of Wisconsin, supra note 90, at 43–44.
106. Id. at 44–45.
107. Id. at 45–46.
108. Id. at 46–47.
109. Murr v. State, No. 2013AP2828, 2014 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1041, at *6–7 (Wis. Ct. App.
2014).
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first time, resulting in a merger.110 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals
confirmed this implication in the Murrs’ second appeal.111 Both the
County and the State note that the Murrs’ parents had owned Lots E
and F in their personal names from 1982 until 1994, when Lot F alone
was transferred to the Murrs.112 Accordingly, the parents’ 1982 transfer
of Lot F from their plumbing company to their personal names brought
the Lots under common ownership and within the scope of the
Ordinance.113 Theoretically, the Murrs’ parents should not have been
allowed to separately transfer the Lots to the Murrs.114
Given that the State and the County define the relevant parcel
based on the property owner’s reasonable expectations of the state
property law, the facts do not support their claim that the Murrs had an
objectively reasonable expectation that the 1995 transfer of Lot E
would result in the Murrs taking title to a single merged parcel.115
Ironically, the County accuses the Murrs of “pick[ing] and choos[ing]
among relevant state laws that define the scope of their property
rights.”116 In fact, the County and the State are engaging in such
behavior by deciding to prohibit the Murrs from selling or developing
Lot E under the Ordinance, while arguing at the same time that the
1982 transfer is irrelevant to the case at hand.117 Regardless of the
merits of the County’s accusation, the fact that the Murrs’ parents were
able to transfer Lot E and Lot F separately to the Murrs seemingly
gives rise to the reasonable belief that the Murrs could do the same.118
B. Penn Central Does Not Require Aggregation of Commonly Owned
Properties
In addition to the factual error underpinning the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals’ decision, Penn Central’s “parcel as a whole” concept does
not require that courts analyze a takings claim by aggregating
commonly owned, contiguous properties that are legally distinct from

110. See Murr v. St. Croix Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 796 N.W. 2d 837, 841–44 (Wis. Ct. App.
2011).
111. Murr, 2014 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1041, at *3.
112. Brief for Respondent St. Croix County, supra note 95, at 12 n.5; Brief for Respondent
State of Wisconsin, supra note 90, at 18 n.9.
113. Petitioners’ Reply Brief, supra note 80, at 10.
114. Id. at 10–11.
115. Brief for Respondent St. Croix County, supra note 95, at 22; Brief for Respondent State
of Wisconsin, supra note 90, at 25.
116. Brief for Respondent St. Croix County, supra note 95, at 32.
117. Id. at 12 n.5.
118. Petitioners’ Reply Brief, supra note 80, at 13–14.
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one another. In Penn Central, a company alleged that a New York City
law effected a taking of its property interest in the airspace above
Grand Central Terminal.119 In denying the takings claim, the Court
stated that “‘[t]akings’ jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel
into discrete segments” but rather focuses on both “the character of the
action and on the nature and extent of the interference with the rights
in the parcel as a whole.”120 The New York City law did not effect a
taking because the property owner attempted to “segment” the
airspace from the rest of the fee property.121
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals correctly stated that the parcel
must be viewed as a whole, but misinterpreted Penn Central by
aggregating the Murrs’ contiguous, commonly owned properties and
analyzing the Murrs’ takings claim as an attempt to segment a single
parcel.122 Penn Central can better be understood as standing for the
principle that property owners cannot claim a compensable taking for
a segmented portion of their property.123 While Penn Central may have
caused confusion by defining the “parcel as a whole” as “the city tax
block designated as the ‘landmark site,’” the Court did not suggest that
the properties comprising the tax block were aggregated simply
because they were contiguous parcels under common ownership.124 In
contrast, Penn Central’s language emphasizes the relevant parcel is a
“single parcel” rather than the aggregation of parcels.125
CONCLUSION
Only eight Justices will decide Murr, as arguments were heard on
the same day the confirmation hearings began for Neil Gorsuch.126
Gorsuch’s absence, a judge commonly compared to the late Justice
Scalia, likely weighs in favor of the State and the County. Assuming
Gorsuch shares Scalia’s embracement of the per se rule for total
119. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 119 (1978).
120. Id. at 130–131.
121. Amicus Curiae Brief of Mountain States Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioners at
9, Murr v. Wisconsin, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016) (No. 15-214).
122. Id. at 9–10.
123. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Nevada, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at
15, Murr, 136 S. Ct. 890 (No. 15-214).
124. Id. at 13–14.
125. Id. at 10.
126. Compare J. David Breemer, Supreme Court schedules oral argument in Murr for March
20, 2017, PAC. LEGAL FOUND.: LIBERTY BLOG (Feb. 3, 2017), http://blog.pacificlegal.org
/supreme-court-schedules-oral-argument-murr-case-march-20-2017/, with Seung Min Kim,
Gorsuch confirmation hearing set for March 20, POLITICO (Feb. 16, 2017),
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/gorsuch-confirmation-hearing-set-for-march-20-235084.
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takings, the State and the County will benefit from his absence because
the Murrs’ success depends on the Court embracing the per se rule.127
Additionally, Justice Kennedy’s opinions in takings clause cases
indicate that he might be more receptive to the State’s and the County’s
position than the rest of the conservative wing of the Court.128
Regardless if the Court rules in favor of the Murrs or the State and the
County, Murr v. Wisconsin provides the Court a crucial opportunity to
clarify the rule for determining the “parcel as a whole.”

127. See Richard Wolf, ‘Scalia Index’ shines light on possible Trump Supreme Court Pick,
USA TODAY (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/01/30/supremecourt-trump-scalia-pryor-gorsuch/97057474.
128. See e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 490–93 (2005) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032–36 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).

